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THE CASE FOR AN ANALYTICAL CONSTRUCTION




Demand guarantees are independent collateral undertakings that secure the
beneficiary against losses arising from the risk of default in an underlying
contract. However, unlike in a true guarantee, the surety’s liability in a demand
guarantee is insulated from disputes arising on the underlying contract as it
is triggered by the beneficiary’s mere demand for payment, without any need
to establish the principal’s default in the underlying contract. A review of
Nigerian law reveals a lack of clarity in the construction and enforcement of
demand guarantees, such that the courts have largely adopted a blanket
approach which erroneously conflates the principles that undergird true
guarantees and demand guarantees, and treats the payment obligation arising
in both categories of guarantee contracts as the same. The consequence of
this approach is to (a) open up the surety in a true guarantee to a primary
liability; or (b) impose an onerous obligation upon the beneficiary in a demand
guarantee to establish default in an underlying contract before the undertaking
may be enforced. This article discusses the need for an analytical approach
to the construction and enforcement of demand guarantees in Nigeria. It
examines the key normative strengths of this approach which includes the
‘pay now, argue later’ rule, and proposes practical legal reforms through
which the analytical approach could be better recognized by Nigerian courts
and in Nigerian laws.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Commercial default undertakings fall into two broad classes: guarantees
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and indemnities.1 A guarantee is, generally, a surety’s promise to a
contract obligor (the beneficiary) that in the event that the contract
obligee (the principal) fails to meet a specified obligation; the surety
would answer for the default, usually by payment of a stated sum.2 On
the other hand, an Indemnity is a surety’s promise to reimburse any
loss said to be suffered by the beneficiary by reason of its dealings with
the principal.3 Thus, a contract of guarantee is considered to be a
secondary obligation because the surety’s liability is contingent upon
establishing the principal’s breach of an obligation owed to the
beneficiary under an underlying contract, while an indemnity contract
is regarded as a primary obligation since the surety assumes immediate
liability upon the beneficiary’s allegation of loss.4
A demand guarantee is a stringent form of an indemnity contract.
Here, a commercial surety assumes unconditional financial payment
obligations as security for the fulfillment of the principal’s contractual
obligations in an underlying contract. The demand guarantee is regarded
as an ‘autonomous’ contract as the payment obligation contained
therein is triggered by the beneficiary’s demand, which complies with
the terms of the guarantee contract, and does not require proof of the
principal’s default under the underlying contract.5
Considering that the ordinary contract of guarantee and the demand
guarantee share generic grouping as commercial default undertakings,
it is common to find the label ‘guarantee’ loosely used to describe an
obligation, which is, in reality, an indemnity, and vice-versa. However,
considering the summary payment obligation which attaches to demand
guarantees, a proper construction of the undertaking comes to the fore
as the classification of an undertaking would have a significant bearing
on the extent and nature of the surety’s liability. This article focuses on
the construction of demand guarantee contracts in Nigeria. The two
approaches to the construction of demand guarantees by the Nigerian
courts are examined, and the case is made for the lesser-used analytical
1 Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millett, Law of Guarantees (6th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2011) 2.
2 Jelili, Omotola, Law of Secured Credit (2nd edn, Evans Brothers Ltd 2006) 10.
3 Peter Tiwell (Nig) Ltd v. Inland Bank (Nig.) Ltd [1997] 3 NWLR (Pt. 496) 408,
420.
4 Andrews and Millett(n 1) 5; Majekodunmi v African International Bank [2012]
2 BFLR 242.
5 David Warne and Nicholas Elliot, Banking Litigation (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell
2005), 273.
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approach, which construes a demand guarantee as a speedy monetary
remedy arising from a surety’s unconditional undertaking that money
will be made available to the beneficiary, upon mere demand, in the
event of a perceived breach of the underlying contract; rather than the
true guarantee approach which requires that an obligor’s default in the
underlying contract be established before the demand guarantee may
be enforced. The error of the latter approach is accentuated by Nigeria’s
loose appellate jurisdiction, which allows the filing of interlocutory
appeals to tie up contractual disputes and, by implication, allow the
avoidance of a payment obligation for several years. But, this is part of
the risks that a demand guarantee was required to secure, in the first
place.
The article is structured into six sections. This introduction is the
first section. Section 2 provides an overview of the commercial nature
of demand guarantees as an autonomous payment obligation. In section
3, the foundational principles governing the construction of demand
guarantees will be outlined. Section 4 discusses the two approaches
to the construction of demand guarantees in the Nigerian courts, and
the triumph of the retrogressive blanket approach. Section 5 makes
the case for an application of the analytical approach to the construction
and enforcement of demand guarantees in Nigeria; while section 6
contains our conclusion.
2.  COMMERCIAL NATURE OF DEMAND GUARANTEES
A demand guarantee (otherwise called ‘bank guarantee’, or ‘on-demand
bond’, or ‘performance bonds’) is a form of an indemnity contract6
issued by a bank or other commercial surety as security to cover losses
arising from certain identified risks; for example, non-performance of
the principal’s obligations, in an underlying contract. By this contract,
the bank undertakes to pay a stated sum of money to the beneficiary
once a demand for payment that complies with the terms of the
guarantee is made. The bank’s undertaking is a primary liability that
crystallizes upon the beneficiary’s compliant demand, without any
reference to the question of the principal’s default in the underlying
contract.7 This principle was recognized in the recent case of Nwosu v.
6 Schmitthoff, Export Trade (11th edn, Smith & Maxwell 2007) para 12-001.
7 See Nelson Enonchong, The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand
Guarantees (Oxford University Press 2011) 1.
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Zenith Bank Plc8 thus:
A banker’s guarantee shall effect payment on demand by the
beneficiary giving a written statement that the principal has failed
to perform his obligations. Such written statement will be the sole
condition for the guarantor to pay under the guarantee. The
guarantor will not take additional steps to determine any facts or
documents relating to the underlying contract or the very
appropriateness of the claim.
Conceptually, demand guarantees evolved in response to market
needs to address the risk of non-performance of contractual obligations
in cross-border contracts for sales of goods, large construction contracts,
and other international contracts where the consequences of exposure
are quite serious, and may not be easily remedied.9 Thus, the party
who will be exposed would usually seek an unconditional indemnity,
which gives immediate access to cash to remedy any contractual default,
without having to await a protracted judicial determination of the
allegation that the supplier has committed a breach of contract and, if
so, the extent of his liability in damages.10 In response to these needs,
banks and other commercial sureties began to issue a specialized class
of guarantees known as ‘on-demand bonds’ whereby if the beneficiary
makes a demand which complies with the terms of the bond, the
guaranteed money would ‘be paid without question, and the rights
and wrongs argued about later’.11 The surety’s ‘guarantee’ addresses
the buyer (or client)’s concerns about the supplier’s failure to meet
contractual obligations by substituting the supplier’s promise of
performance for the promise of a ‘solvent’ and ‘reliable paymaster’.12
8 [2015] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1464) 314, 323 [B].
9 Disputes between parties to an international contract may result in protracted
and expensive cross-border legal proceedings, which are often bedevilled with
jurisdiction and enforcement problems. See J. C. T. Chuah, Law of International
Trade: Cross-Border Commercial Transactions (4th edn., Sweet & Maxwell 2009)
517-519.
10 Enonchong (n 7) 1; See also State Trading Corp of India v. EDF & FM Ltd [1981]
Com. L.R. 235.
11 Gerard McMeel, ‘Pay Now, Argue Later’(1999) LMCLQ 5, 6. See also Cargill
International SA v. Bangladesh Sugar & Foood Industries Corp. [1996] 4 All ER
563, 568.
12 Soproma SpA v. Marine & Animals By-Products Corp. [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 367,
385 [McNair J].
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Moreover, it is also a ‘risk-distributing device’13 which allocates litigation
risks and puts funds into the pocket of the beneficiary, pending the
resolution of the dispute.14
In other words, in an international transaction, a demand guarantee
may be used to shift the burden of litigation such as the length of the
proceedings, burden of proof, risk of currency fluctuation during
litigation; and, most importantly, the forum of the litigation,15 to the
principal. It is important to note that notwithstanding the use of the
word ‘guarantee’; unless the wordings of the surety’s undertaking so
expressly indicate, a demand guarantee will rarely be construed as a
‘guarantee’ in the true legal sense, i.e., an undertaking to pay only if
the obligor/principal is in default.16 In practice, a demand guarantee is
worded as a surety’s primary liability contract to pay a stated sum to
the beneficiary, once the terms of the undertaking are satisfied.17
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in African Insurance Development
Corporation v. Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Ltd endorsed the above
approach,18 where the court stated that:
If the performance bond is an ‘on demand bond’, as argued by the
plaintiff, the defendant’s liability would follow merely on a demand
for payment made in good faith without a need to prove the validity
of the claim. [Emphasis added]
It must also be noted that a demand guarantee is not intended to
give a windfall payment to the beneficiary. The law is settled that if
13 Michael Coleman, ‘Performance Guarantee’ (1990) LMCLQ 223.
14 Howard Bennett, ‘Performance Bonds and the Principle of Autonomy’ (1994)
JBL 574, 580.
15 Chung Hsin-Hsu, ‘The Independence of Demand Guarantees, Performance
Bonds and Standby Letters of Credit’(2006)1(2) National Taiwan University
Law Review 4.
16 Heisler v. Anglo-Dal Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1273, 1276.
17 I. O. Smith notes that insurance companies who only charge a premium for
issuing a guarantee and do not have the comfort of a counter-indemnity, are
more inclined to issue a true guarantee undertaking which requires proof of
default before payment. However, banks do not usually want to be drawn into
disputes arising from the underlying contract, and would prefer to issue a
demand guarantee as they see the undertaking as a financial service which will
be provided, in so far as the client’s financial position with the bank is adequate
and a satisfactory counter-indemnity is provided. I. O. Smith, Nigerian Law of
Secured Credit (2nd edn., Ecowatch Publications 2001) 400.
18 [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 653) 494, 503.
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there is a call on a bond in circumstances where the beneficiary has
not suffered any material loss, or if he was being paid more than the
actual loss, which he sustained, then the party who provided the bond
will be entitled under the underlying contract to recover the [over]
payment.19
3.  CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERGIRD
DEMAND GUARANTEES
The construction of a demand guarantee involves construing the surety’s
undertaking in its factual and contractual context, having regard to its
commercial purpose. ‘Looking at the contract without any preconception
as to what it is’ approaches this task.20 It is the substance of the surety’s
obligations, rather than the form of the contract, that would determine
the extent of the surety’s obligations.21 Thus, the fact that the surety
undertaking is tagged ‘Indemnity Agreement’,22 or states that the surety
is to be liable as ‘principal debtor’23 does not necessarily turn a true
guarantee obligation into a demand guarantee. This is because, in law,
if an indemnity obligation is couched in terms which make it plain that
it is predicated upon an underlying liability of the principal, the
obligation must be construed to be a true guarantee.24 Indeed, in the
African Insurance Development Corporation case,25 the Supreme Court
of Nigeria was careful to stress that:
It is not the tag put on the Bond that determines the obligation
incurred thereby, but rather, the contents of the Bond. The proper
approach when there is dispute as to whether the obligation incurred
on a bond is to pay on demand or whether the obligation incurred
is that of a suretyship is to revert to the contents of the bond…
19 See Cargill Int. SA v. Bangadesh Sugar & Food Industries Corp[1998] 1 WLR 461
(CA); Comdel Commodities v. Siporex Trade SA [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 424;
Uzinterimpex JSC v. Standard Bank Plc. [2008] EWCA Civ. 819.
20 Gold Coast v. Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo [2001] EWCA Civ. 1806,
paragraphs 11 and 15 [Tuckey LJ].
21 Peter Cassidy, ‘Selected Questions in the Field of Bank Guarantees’ (Unpublished
paper) 2<http://law.wustl.edu/Library/cdroms/IBL/Conarb/W23/
Cas.htm>accessed12 August 2011.
22 Stadium Finance Co Ltd v. Helm [1965] 109 SJ 471.
23 Heald v O’Connor [1971] 1 WLR 497, 503.
24 Andrews and Millett (n 1)  14-15.
25 African Insurance Development Corporation (n 18) 506.
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Furthermore, Andrews and Millett26 has also suggested that in
constructing a surety’s obligation, the pertinent question that should
be asked is: considering the wording of the undertaking, would the
surety be liable irrespective of whether the principal has defaulted? If
the answer is yes, then the surety’s liability is primary, and the contract
is a demand guarantee, and not a true guarantee.
The English case of Associated British Ports v. Ferryways NV27 is a
good example of how the construction of a surety’s obligations impacts
on his liabilities. The central question in this case was whether a surety
undertaking was a true guarantee or an indemnity (demand guarantee).
This question was important because the creditor had subsequently
entered into another agreement with the principal debtor, which would
have had the effect of discharging the surety’s liability under a true
guarantee, but not under an indemnity. The surety’s undertaking defined
the surety’s obligations by reference to the principal debtor’s fulfillment
of all of its ‘duties, commitments and liabilities entered into and/or
incurred by reason of the Agreement as and when they fall due’. The
Court of Appeal held that the undertaking was a true guarantee: the
surety was to ‘see to it’ that the debtor performed its obligations under
its contract with the creditor. It would only be when the debtor could
not meet its primary liability to the creditor ‘as and when they fall
due’, that the secondary liability of the surety crystallized.
In Eboni Finance & Securities Ltd v. Wole-Ojo Technical Services,28 a
project owner acted as surety to the contractor’s application for a bank
loan to enable him execute the project, and wrote a letter to the bank
to ‘guarantee’ that the proceeds of the contract will be directly remitted
to the bank. In the surety’s letter, it was however stated that: ‘We
hereby guarantee prompt payment within 30 days of delivery or
completion of the job.’ The contractor collected the loan, but did not
deliver the job. The surety declined liability to reimburse the bank.
Held, upon a proper construction of the surety’s undertaking, the letter
was a true guarantee, and thereby unenforceable, as the surety’s promise
to pay the contract sum to the bank was made conditional upon the
contractor’s delivery of the job, which was never done.
26 Andrews and Millett (n 1) 56-57.
27 [2009] EWCA Civ. 189; [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 585.
28 [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 461) 464, 476.
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4.  TWO APPROACHES TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF
DEMAND GUARANTEES IN NIGERIA
In Lingo (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwodo,29 the Court of Appeal defined a bank
guarantee as:
A bank guarantee is a security or undertaking given by a bank in
respect of a transaction in which the bank shall be bound to fulfill
its undertaking on demand. It is a promise by a bank to answer
for the payment of some debt, or the performance of a duty in
case of the failure of another who is liable in the first instance.
[Emphasis added]
The above passage characterizes the muddled approach of the
Nigerian courts to the construction of demand guarantees: the court
failed to make the crucial distinction between a true guarantee and a
demand guarantee, and gave a blanket definition that lumped up the
features of both types of surety undertakings in its definition of a bank
guarantee. As noted above, a bank guarantee may be construed as a
demand guarantee, payable-on-demand as a primary obligation.
Alternatively, it may be a true guarantee, payable only where the default
of the principal is established. But, a bank guarantee cannot stand as
both, as the above passage suggests.
The Nigerian law of guarantees is essentially case law driven.30 A
review of Nigerian case law over the past 30 years (i.e. 1985-date) on
the subject however reveals that the law has not been properly
developed such as to be a serious guide on the nature of obligations
that arises from default undertakings in this part of the world. In our
respectful view, the problem (as we shall shortly see) is mainly rooted
in the failure of our courts to recognize the crucial distinction between
a true guarantee and a demand guarantee. In many instances, the courts
simply adopted the true guarantee approach of requiring proof of default
in the underlying contract to the task of the construction of surety
undertakings. This erroneous approach had had the retrogressive effect
29 [2004] 7 NWLR (Pt. 874) 30, 44.
30 Section 4 of the Statutes of Fraud (1677) Act and Section 2 of the Contract Law
(Cap 250) of the 1959 Laws of Western Nigeria (applicable in the succeeding
states), which impose a requirement that contracts of guarantees must be in
writing, are the only known statutory intervention in Nigeria.
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of stifling the growth of the legal principles that separately undergird
true guarantee contracts and demand guarantee contracts.
The two major approaches of the Nigerian courts to the issue of
the construction of demand guarantee contracts are discussed below:
The Analytical Approach
Here, a dichotomy is recognized between demand guarantees (a form
of an indemnity contract) on the one hand and true guaranteed
contracts on the other hand, and the court before coming to a
conclusion on the surety’s liability carefully considers the exact nature
of the surety’s obligations in an undertaking. Unfortunately, the courts
rarely adopt this approach.
In Apugo& Sons Ltd v. African Continental Bank& Anor,31 a bank
sued a contractor to recover a loan facility that was granted on the
strength of the client’s indemnity letter, which unconditionally promised
to remit the proceeds of the contract to the bank. The trial court
construed the client’s indemnity letter as a true guarantee and held
that the contractor was primarily responsible for repaying the loan to
the bank. The contractor appealed against this judgment and joined
the client (the Ministry of Agriculture) to the appeal. The appeal was
argued by the parties on the basis that the question of who; as between
the contractor or the client, is primarily liable to satisfy the bank’s
loan, would turn on whether the client’s letter was a true guarantee or
an indemnity contract. In constructing the indemnity letter, the Court
of Appeal held that:
It was quite manifest that the Ministry of Agriculture entered into
an independent contract or security to prevent the bank from being
damnified by an act, the loan granted, which the Bank did at the
request of the Ministry of Agriculture, the indemnor…
This is the purpose of the indemnity: The Ministry asked the Bank
to supply the Appellant with overdraft facility and it entered into
an undertaking with the Bank that it would see the Bank paid. It
was not a guarantee that ‘if the Appellant did not pay you, we
would.’ That, in my view, is the fundamental distinction. Upon all
the authorities, I am satisfied that the whole structure of the Exhibit
31 [1989] 1 Commercial Law Review Quarterly (published by NWLR) 87.
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A as I interpret it, is to conclude that the contract is an indemnity,
and not a guarantee. In this matter of the contract of indemnity,
the surety; the Ministry of Agriculture, assumed a primary liability
without the principal debtor, the Appellant. [Emphasis added]
We entirely agree with the court’s reasoning. Indeed, the client’s
indemnity was a primary obligation undertaking to cover the bank’s
exposure on its loan to the contractor. In the leading case of African
Insurance Development Corporation v. Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas,32
a guarantor provided a performance bond in support of a contractor’s
obligations on a construction project. The contractor defaulted on the
project, and the client/beneficiary sued to enforce the performance
bond. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nigeria, one of the issues
before the court was whether the beneficiary could summarily enforce
the guarantor’s undertaking without showing proof of contractor’s
default. While the court did not make an express reference to the Apugo
case, its approach to the issue of construction of the surety’s undertaking
was a clear endorsement of the analytical approach:
[Performance] bonds may be classified according to the obligation
undertaken by the obligee. In some cases it is, in reality, a
conditional guarantee, while in others, it may be what is described
as an ‘on demand bond’ or, as it is sometimes called a ‘first demand
bond’. If the performance bond is an ‘on demand bond’, as argued
by the plaintiff, the defendant’s liability would follow merely on a
demand for payment made in good faith without a need to prove
the validity of the claim... [Emphasis added]
In our view, the above approach is unimpeachable. A demand
guarantee should be constructed on its terms: a surety’s unconditional
undertaking to provide funds on-demand, without requiring the
beneficiary to invest time and money in proving the validity of his
claim.
The Blanket Approach
In the majority of cases, the Nigerian courts adopted a blanket ‘all-
size-fits’ principle to constructing of all forms of surety undertakings as
a true guarantee contract where evidence of the principal’s default must
32 [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 653) 494, 505-506.
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be proffered before the surety’s undertaking may be enforced. In the
Eboni Finance case,33 a project owner/surety wrote a ‘guarantee letter’
to assure the Bank that the proceeds of the contract will be directly
remitted to the bank ‘within 30 days of delivery or completion of the
job.’ The Court of Appeal, without making any attempt to ascertain the
nature of the surety’s obligations undertaking, construed the
undertaking according to the label, and concluded that the surety’s
promise was a guarantee. In our respectful view, while the court was
ultimately right to treat the surety undertaking as a guarantee, its
conclusion was premised on a wrong reasoning.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Fortune International Bank Plc v.
Pegasus Trading Office enthroned the blanket approach.34 Here, a bank
undertook, on behalf of an importer, to remit the payment of the balance
due on a supply contract to the exporter. The goods were supplied, but
the importer failed to make payment, and the bank similarly failed to
honour its undertaking. The exporter sued both the bank and the
importer to recover the debt. The trial court dismissed the action against
the bank, but gave judgment against the importer. The Court of Appeal,
however, set aside the trial court’s judgment and held both defendants
jointly and severally liable. The bank appealed to the Supreme Court,
and one of the issues before the court was whether the bank’s
undertaking could be enforced as an indemnity to settle the importer’s
indebtedness to the exporters. In its judgment, the court, per Uwaifo
JSC, stated that:
In matters of guarantee of this nature ... either of two situations
could arise. One is that the guarantor may not primarily undertake
to discharge the liability but only if the principal debtor failed in
his obligation. There is the other situation where a person by his
undertaking makes himself the real debtor… In the first case, the
principal debtor has to default before the liability of the guarantor
would arise. In the second case, the principal debtor simply drops
out so that the guarantor becomes solely liable. Exhibit P13
unequivocally represents this scenario. The tendency is that the
law appears to have moved to the center to make the right of the
creditor less conditional. The creditor is now entitled to proceed
against the guarantor without or independent of the incident of
the default of the principal debtor. [Emphasis added]
33 [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 461) 464.
34 [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 86) 369.
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In the first part of the above passage, the Supreme Court clearly
accepted the distinction between a true guarantee and a demand
guarantee. Furthermore, the court found that the bank’s undertaking
was a demand guarantee: ‘Exhibit P13 unequivocally represents this
[second] scenario.’ By this finding, the court effectively settled the
question of liability in this case.
However, in the second (underlined) part of the passage, Uwaifo
JSC (a highly regarded jurist of his time) surprisingly stated that: ‘the
law appears to have moved to the centre to make the right of the
creditor less conditional’. The above statement, as seen above, was
made in the context of discussing both true guarantees and demand
guarantees contracts, but was not carefully qualified as relating only to
demand guarantees. Accordingly, this principle seemed to have conflated
the distinction between true guarantees and demand guarantees. The
unintended consequence of this approach is to expose the surety in a
true guarantee to a primary liability such as may only be imputed in a
demand guarantee.
The above statement is more surprising as, at any event, the law
does not ‘move’ to make a new contract for the parties by making a
conditional contract less conditional. It is trite law that the courts
cannot make a new contract for the parties, but would merely enforce
the parties’ contract by interpreting the words used by the parties
themselves.
In the subsequent case of Nwankwo v. Ecumenical Dev. Cooperative
Society,35 the Appellants guaranteed a loan of $500,000.00 granted by
the Respondent to a company owned and operated by the Appellants.
When the loan was due for repayment, the company defaulted. The
Respondent invoked the guarantee agreement and demanded that the
Appellants should settle the debt. Although the sureties admitted the
debt, they disputed their obligation to repay the debt. Thereupon, the
Respondent sought to enforce the guarantee by filing a suit under the
undefended list procedure. The trial court found that no meritorious
defence was disclosed in the sureties’ Notice of Intention to defend
the suit, and entered judgment for the Respondent. The sureties’ appeals
to the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Nigeria were
dismissed. Our point of interest in this case relates to the court’s
construction of the sureties’ undertaking:
35 [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 377.
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WE, … hereby guarantee to you the payment on demand of all
sums which are now or at any time or times hereafter may become
due or owing or may be accruing or become due to you by the
borrower. [Emphasis added]
The Supreme Court placed reliance on the principle espoused in
the Fortune v. Pegasus case to arrive at the conclusion that the above
undertaking was a ‘contract of guarantee’. The court then enforced the
contract on the basis of evidence that the sureties had admitted that
the principal debtor took a loan from the Respondent, which loan has
not been satisfied. In our view, this approach to the construction of
the sureties’ obligation is wrong. The court ought to have considered
that the sureties’ primary liability in the above undertaking arose upon
a simple demand. Accordingly, the only evidence that was required
related to the quantum of the debt, and not of the principal’s default in
making payment. Arguably, assuming that the facts of the matter were
cast differently; for instance, if the sureties had not admitted the
principal’s indebtedness to the creditor and had contested their liability,
it would have been impossible to summarily enforce the demand
guarantee against the sureties.
In Chami v. United Bank for Africa,36 the surety of a bank loan
executed a ‘Guarantee Agreement’ in the following terms:
I… the undersigned hereby guarantee to you the payment of, and
undertake on demand in writing made on the undersigned … to
pay you all the sums of money which may now be due or which
may hereafter become due…
Upon the debtor’s default, the bank sued the surety. The case went
up to the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court ultimately
enforced the surety contract, it is regrettable that the court, once again,
conditioned the enforcement of the surety’s obligation by proof of the
principal’s default to settle his debt in the underlying contract.
In Dragetanos Construction (Nig.) Ltd v. Fab Madis Ventures Ltd,37
the retrogressive approach again resulted in a demand guarantee being
construed as a contract of guarantee. In this case, the Appellant made
a N10 million advance payment to mobilize the contractor in a road
36 2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 471, 501.
37 [2011] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1273) 308, 400.
260 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 2: 2016
construction contract. To cover this payment, a surety bank issued two
Advance Payment Guarantees (APGs) in favour of the Appellant, in
the following terms: We undertake to pay you the said [N10 million]
or part thereof on your first demand confirming that the contractor has
not fulfilled their contractual obligation. [Emphasis added]
The contract was not properly performed, leading to an early
termination. The contractor filed a pre-emptive suit to prevent the
Appellant from making a call on the APGs, but the Appellant counter-
claimed to enforce the APGs. In its judgement, the trial court accepted
the contractor’s case, and dismissed the counter-claim. On appeal, an
issue arose as to the legal nature of the APG. The contractor submitted
that the APG was a contract of guarantee and that proof of default by
way of obtaining an arbitral award or judgment is a condition precedent
to the bank’s liability on the APG. The Court of Appeal initially rejected
this argument. Relying on the Fortune Bank v. Pegasus case, the court
stated a muddled principle at:38
Thus, the fact that the obligations of the guarantor arise only
when the principal has defaulted in his obligations to the creditor
does not mean that the creditor has to demand payment from the
surety. Nor does he have to commence proceedings against the
principal, whether criminal or civil, unless there is an express
term in the contract requiring him to do so. In addition, the
liability of the guarantor becomes due and mature, immediately
the debtor/borrower become unable to pay his outstanding debt.
The guarantor’s liability is said to have crystallized. [Emphasis
added]
In our view, the above statement is patently erroneous as the
demand guarantee under consideration in this case was a surety
unconditional promise to pay a stated sum upon demand to the
beneficiary. The bank’s payment obligation crystallizes upon the
beneficiary’s demand, and not when the principal/debtor is found to
be in default, as wrongly espoused by the court. Applying the above
flawed foundation, the court, inevitably, had to seek for proof of the
contractor’s default in the underlying contract to justify the enforcement
of the APGs. Considering the dearth of judicial pronouncements on
the legal nature of APG contracts in Nigeria, it is regrettable that the
38 Fortune International Bank(n 34) 400-401.
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Court of Appeal missed a rare opportunity to develop the law, building
on the foundational principles that were correctly stated in the Apugo
and the African Insurance Development Corporation cases.
We conclude this section with the questionable decision in Welco
Industriale S.P.A. v. Nwanyanwu & Sons Enterprises.39 Here, an exporter,
Welco SPA (‘Welco’), imported certain equipment to Nigeria, and in
the Customs Declaration Bond furnished to the pre-shipment inspection
agents, it declared that the Plaintiff was its Nigerian agent (as statutorily
required under Section 1(1)(2), and 2(1) of the Pre-shipment Inspection
of Imports Decree 37 of 1978), and that an agency commission of
$500,000 was payable to the Plaintiff. Subsequently, however, Welco
refused to pay the said commission, saying that the Plaintiff ’s name
was only inscribed on the Customs Declaration Bond as a matter of
legal formality and that the Plaintiff did not actually render any service
to it. The Plaintiff sued to recover the commission, and the key issue
between the parties before the trial court was whether a contract existed
between the parties. In the Customs Declaration Bond, Welco had
declared that:
With this, we hereby declare under our full responsibility that on
the prices in our invoice, for the above goods:
(a) That a commission of 4.4% is recognised, calculated on the
F.O.B. price for the amount of US $500,000 to the company J.I.
Nwanyanwu and Sons Enterprise Nigeria Limited – 4 Milverton
Avenue, P. O. Box 2667 Aba, Nigeria.
(b) Except what has been indicated in paragraph (a), no other
commission, compensation, out-invoice discount will be accorded
to our customer or other people.
The trial court found that the above declaration had helped Welco
to satisfy the legal requirement for the issuance of a clean report of
findings, and gave judgement in favour of the Plaintiff. On Welco’s
appeal, the Plaintiff raised the argument that the Customs Declaration
Bond was an ‘on-demand bond’ under which Welco was bound to pay
agency commission to it. Surprisingly, the Court of Appeal accepted
this argument. The Court stated that:
‘… A bond merely amounts to a covenant to pay a sum of money,
and is adopted partly because the form is sanctioned by antiquity,
39 [2005] 32 WRN 133.
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and partly because it is sometimes more flexible than an ordinary
covenant…
In A.I.D.C. v. NLNG [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 653)494, a performance
bond was considered. In the lead judgment of Ayoola JSC, stated as
follows at pages 503-504:
Performance bonds are bonds made to secure the performance of
a principal contract. Such bonds may be classified according to
the obligation undertaken by the obligee. In some cases it is, in
reality, a conditional guarantee, while in others, it may be what is
described as an ‘on demand bond’ or, as it is sometimes called a
first demand bond’.
The procurement of the clean report of findings (Exhibit D-D3)
enabled the Central Bank to remit the foreign exchange obtained
by the buyer to pay for the machinery and spare parts to the
Appellant. Once the clean report of findings was issued by SGS,
the Respondent was entitled to the commission. I therefore hold
the view that Exhibit F is an on-demand bond and the Respondent
was right to sue on it.
In our view, the above analysis is seriously misconceived. As earlier
stated, an on-demand bond is a primary liability obligation, which
arises from a surety’s unconditional promise to pay, on demand, a
stated sum to a beneficiary. Turning to the wordings of Welco’s Customs
Declaration Bond, it would be seen that Welco merely stated that: ‘a
commission of 4.4 per cent is recognized, calculated on the F.O.B. price
for the amount of US $500,000 to the company J. I. Nwanyanwu and
Sons.’ In our respectful opinion, whilst it is arguable that, by this
declaration, Welco recognized that a commission is due to the Plaintiff;
we are of the view, with the greatest respect to the Court of Appeal,
that Welco’s declaration is not, by any stretch, a primary obligation
that engages an unconditional payment liability, upon demand.
5.  THE CASE FOR A CONSISTENT APPLICATION
OF THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH
A commentator has observed that guarantees are taken to provide a
40 Phillip Wood, Law and Practice of International Law: Comparative Law of Security
and Guarantees (Oxford, 1995) 313.
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second pocket to pay if the first should be empty.40 In our view, a demand
guarantee goes a step better: it ensures the availability of a rich pocket
that cannot be bogged down with dilatory objections to payment.
Observably, to achieve this ideal in Nigeria, the law relating to the
construction and enforcement of demand guarantees must be clear
and consistently applied. Currently, this is not the case.
There are several reasons why the Nigerian law relating to demand
guarantees is hazy. First, there is the perplexing failure of the courts to
recognize the crucial distinction between a true guarantee and a demand
guarantee. In many instances (discussed above), the courts adopted a
blanket approach of requiring proof of the principal’s default in the
underlying contract to the construction of all forms of guarantee
undertakings. This approach has the unfortunate effect of stifling the
growth of the legal principles that undergird demand guarantee
contracts. Perhaps, the legal doctrine of stare decisis is to blame for this
state of affair.
Traditionally, Nigerian courts prefer to follow well-tread (albeit
erroneous) paths, and are overly cautious of developing new principles
that maybe seen as being subversive of the established order. For
example, in the Dragetanos case, after the Court of Appeal had, rightly,
rejected the contractor’s argument that the APG at issue was a contract
of guarantee, wherein proof of default is a condition precedent to the
bank’s liability on the APG; the court somehow felt obliged to cite the
Supreme Court’s views in Fortune Bank v. Pegasus, which resulted in a
contrary dicta that the obligations of the guarantor arise only when
the principal has defaulted in his obligations to the creditor. Inevitably,
the court handed down a muddled and contradictory judgement.41 In
our view, law is a living concept, and judges should be courageous to
throw off shackles of bad law wherever it manifests, moreso that surety
contracts are flexible commercial instruments, which evolved in
response to market needs.
Second, while it is true that legal principles are not formulated in
vacuum, and that it is the complexities and novelty of disputes that
are submitted for judicial resolution that affords an opportunity for
development of the law; it is observed that even where the opportunity
41 For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Kolawole Mayomi, ‘Dragetanos (Nig.)
Ltd v. Fab-Madis Ventures Ltd: A Missed Opportunity to Develop the Law relating
to Advance Payment Guarantees in Nigeria’ (2015) 3(2) Appellate Review.
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arises, the Nigerian courts often appeared to be more interested in
discussing procedural points, than in developing substantive principles
of law that would be an invaluable guide to the men of commerce on
how to conduct their business. Again, in the Dragetanos case, it will be
seen that the court bypassed a rare opportunity to develop the law
relating to Advance Payment Guarantees in Nigeriain its undue
attention, for the bulk of its judgement, to the issue of the joinder of
the bank to the contractor’s counter-claim.
Furthermore, in many other cases, the courts seemed to have a
proclivity to reproducing counsel’s arguments as the bulk of their
judgments, instead of focusing on the task of construction of the surety’s
contractual obligations. This approach may be contrasted with the
approach of the English Court of Appeal in Wuhan Guoyu Logistics v.
Emporiki Bank,42 where that court dealt with complex issues arising
from the construction and enforcement of an Advance Payment
Guarantee in a concise judgment of less than 11 pages. The court
described the 20-page judgment of the trial court43 as ‘an exhausting
document’, and observed that ‘something has surely gone wrong if
this comparatively simple question of construction requires such lengthy
consideration… the commercial community deserves better than this,
if better can be done’.44
Thirdly, the broad problem of Nigeria’s loose appellate system is a
contributory factor to the lack of development of substantive legal
principles in the field of demand guarantees. A good example is the
African Development Insurance Corporation case, where the Respondent
sought to enforce a Performance Bond given by a contractor who had
failed to deliver on a contractual obligation. Unfortunately, the case
got bogged down with threshold jurisdiction issues and the appeal to
the Supreme Court merely settled (about eight years after filing the
suit) the question of the appropriate forum, and did not decide
substantive issues relating to enforcement of the Bond.
Drawing the threads of the argument together, there is a compelling
need for Nigerian courts to adopt an analytical approach of making a
proper distinction between a true guarantee contract and a demand
guarantee in the construction of surety contracts. This approach will,
42 [2012] EWCA Civ. 1629.
43 2012] EWHC 1715 Comm.
44 Wuhan Guoyu Logistics (n 42) [22].
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in our view, bring into full focus the commercial essence of demand
guarantee contracts: ‘pay now, argue later’.45 In other words, a demand
guarantee ensures the availability of funds for the timely completion
of the underlying contract, as a guarantor who has promised to make
payment, on demand, of a stated sum upon demand to cover the event
of default will be held to his bargain, and would not be allowed to
subject the beneficiary to a prolonged judicial resolution of a dispute
on who is at fault.
This rule was applied in the recent English case of Team Telecom
International Ltd v. Hutchinson 3G,46  where A contracted to supply B
with a software which would monitor and manage B’s mobile phone
network, and a demand guarantee was provided by a bank to secure
A’s obligations under the contract. B made a call on the guarantee
following an allegation that A was in breach. The grounds relied upon
by the bank in refusing to pay were varied, and ranged from an allegation
that the call was made in bad faith, to B’s failure to meet the formalities
of the demand. The court held that it was unable to summarily decide
the parties’ contentions because the factual and technical issues were
quite complicated and could only be properly determined at a full trial.
The court upheld B’s demand, on the ground that since C’s undertaking
was a demand guarantee, it would be contrary to the presumed
intention of the parties to allow the bank to refuse to pay until its
liability was determined at trial.
Secondly, an analytical construction of demand guarantee
obligations will determine the important issue of the standard of proof
in enforcing the surety’s obligations. The standard of proof in enforcing
a demand guarantee contract is low: once the beneficiary makes a
contractually-compliant demand on the guarantee, the contract must
be enforced regardless of the merits of the call, except where the
demand is manifestly fraudulent.
The situation is different in a true guarantee contract where the
beneficiary bears a higher evidentiary burden of establishing the
principal’s default in the underlying contract before the surety’s payment
obligation may be enforced. In our view, the Nigerian court’s blanket
approach to the construction of all surety obligations as a true guarantee
has the effect, particularly in the context of demand guarantees, of
45 McMeel (n 11).
46  [2003] EWHC 762 (TCC).
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making the beneficiary be a ran unnecessary evidentiary burden of
establishing the principal’s default in the underlying contract. This
problem with this approach is clearly appreciated in a large construction
project or international sale contract where milestone payments are
required to enable timeous delivery of the contract. Where the principal
disputes that a milestone payment is due, and the beneficiary is required
to firstly establish default in the underlying contract before it can call
upon the surety to make payment, the attention of the contracting
parties would be taken up with a contest over who is at fault before
the parties can move to the next stage of the contract, and the time-
essence of the contract will be lost.
Thirdly, a consistent application of the analytical approach to the
construction of demand guarantee undertakings will send positive vibes
to the global financial market that the Nigerian courts are willing to
take a commercial approach that recognizes the dynamics of commercial
obligations. This development will help to instil confidence in financial
market operators to submit disputes relating to other specialized
financial instruments like swaps, derivatives, etc. to Nigerian law.
Although these instruments are now widely used in the Nigerian
financial system; in practice, the dispute resolution clauses in these
instruments almost always defer to the jurisdiction of English courts,
such that to date; there is no reported Nigerian judicial pronouncement
on these important contractual species.
In recommending an analytical approach to the construction of
demand guarantees, we are not unmindful of the attendant danger of
fraud.47 Obviously, if a demand guarantee may be readily turned into
money, unscrupulous beneficiaries would make unjustified demands
for payment where the risk that is covered by the demand guarantee
has not yet materialized. Indeed, in some of the reviewed cases, it will
appear that some judges were probably influenced by a subconscious
concern on fraud, going by their hesitation to declare the surety’s
obligations as enforceable upon the beneficiary’s mere demand. These
47 Michelle Kelly-Louw, ‘International Measures to Prohibit Fraudulent Calls on
Demand Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit’ (2010) 1(1) Geo Mason
Journal of Int’l Comm. Law 74.
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fears are probably justified. As at today, there is no general body of
rules in Nigeria which addresses the problem of abusive calls on demand
guarantee contracts.48
Accordingly, therefore, it is necessary to have a statutory
intervention to deal with the gamut of issues that arise from the proper
construction and enforcement of demand guarantees; as well as to set
definitive standards of conduct that may constitute an abusive call on
a demand guarantee in Nigeria. In clearly defined situations where
fraud is manifest, the surety may, perhaps, be statutorily empowered
to demand for proof of default under the underlying contract. At any
event, we find it unsatisfactory that, in the present age where demand
guarantees are routinely tendered in the global market for goods and
services, the question of how the local Nigerian court will approach
the construction and enforcement of a demand guarantee remains
opaque.49 From this perspective alone, it is clear that statutory
intervention is urgent and needful.
Considering the complex and oftenlong-drawn process of law
making, we propose the convenient option of Nigeria’s immediate
ascension to, and domestication of the United Nations Convention on
Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit 1995.50 Indeed,
the Explanatory Notes to the Convention provide the following
compelling reasons:
48 Although the ICC Uniform Rules on Demand Guarantees (URDG 758) makes a
commendable attempt to deal with the problem of abusive calls, it would be
seen that this instrument is not of public application; as it is a standard-term
contract rules which only apply where parties have chosen to incorporate them
into their contract.
49 Kelly-Louw (n 47)  95-96 notes that jurisdictions that do not fashion efficient
rules, procedurally and otherwise, for resolving questions of fraud will soon
find that credits and guarantees issued by their banks are not acceptable in the
world markets.
50 The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by
Letters of Credit was prepared by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and was adopted and opened for
signature by the UN General Assembly by its resolution 50/48 of 11 December
1995. As of 1 July 2015, eight nations have ratified or acceded to the Convention:
Belarus, Ecuador, El-Salvador, Gabon, Kuwait, Liberia, Panama and Tunisia. The
United States of America has signed the Convention but has not yet ratified it
or acceded to it. See the United Nations Treaty Status Database, Chapter X § 15
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-
15&chapter=10&lang=en> accessed 20 October 2016.
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3. Independent undertakings covered by the Convention are basic
tools of international commerce. They are used in a variety of
situations… Yet familiarity with the instrument[s] covered by the
Convention is not universal; there is an absence of legislative
provisions dealing with them... and important questions confronting
users, practitioners and courts in the daily life of these instruments
are beyond the power of the parties to settle contractually.
45. A main purpose of the Convention is to establish greater
uniformity internationally in the manner in which guarantor/issuers
and courts respond to allegations of fraud or abuse in demands
for payment under independent guarantees and stand-by letters of
credit. That has been a particularly troublesome and disruptive
area in practice because allegations of fraud have a tendency to
arise when there is a dispute as to the performance of an underlying
contractual obligation.
46. The Convention helps to ameliorate the problem by providing
an internationally agreed general definition of the types of
situations in which an exception to the obligation to pay against
a facially compliant demand would be justified.
In our view, considering the Convention’s above objectives, vis-a-
via our previous discussions on the problems that generally surrounds
the Nigerian law relating to demand guarantees, the domestication of
the Convention in Nigeria would go a long way in bringing clarity to
the construction and enforcement of demand guarantee contracts.
6.  CONCLUSION
The law relating to demand Guarantees in Nigeria has stagnated, if not
regressed, since the African Insurance Development Corp case. The major
reason for this stagnation is because the Nigerian courts, in the majority
of the cases before them, failed to make a proper distinction between
a true guarantee and a demand guarantee. Aside stultifying the growth
of the law, this blanket approach is retrogressive as it (a) fails to reflect
the true intent of the contracting parties properly, and (b) defeats the
commercial purpose that requires the tender of a demand guarantee.
Accordingly, Nigerian courts should, as a matter of necessity, adopt
the analytical approach whereby the dichotomy between an indemnity
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contract and a true guarantee is observed, and the surety’s liability
turns upon the proper construction of the surety’s contractual
obligations. Where a surety undertaking is classified as a demand
guarantee, the summary payment obligations that are attendant upon
this class of surety undertaking should naturally follow. This approach
accords with best global practices and would ensure that Nigerian
decisions are respected and enforced among the comity of nations.51
Statutory intervention would be an effective way of reversing the
present regressive approach to the construction of demand guarantees
in Nigeria, and enthroning the analytical approach. Moreover,
considering the liquid nature of demand guarantees and the danger of
fraudulent calls thereon, such statutory intervention will set a definite
standard of the conduct that constitutes an abusive call on a demand
guarantee, as well as to prescribe clear instances in which proof of
default under an underlying contract may actually be required under a
demand guarantee.
51 It is instructive to note the case of Power Curber International v. National Bank
of Kuwait [1981] 1 WLR 1233, a Kuwaiti Court ordered that an English bank
should not honour a call on a performance bond on the grounds that there was
no proof of default in the underlying contract. The English Court of Appeal
discountenanced this order. Griffiths LJ who delivered the judgement of the
Court said: ‘… whenever possible this court will in the interests of comity seek to
recognise and uphold the order of a friendly state. But, unhappily in this case, the
approach of the Kuwaiti court appears to be so out of step with that of our own
courts and the courts of other trading nations that I fear that we cannot recognise
it. The choice lies between upholding the worldwide practices of international
commerce or the order of the Kuwaiti courts. I choose the first option.’
